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3 BRIAN MAGUIRE, 
Defendant and Appellant, [ Pr ior i ty No. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a f i rs t appeal of r ight . Defendant, Brian Maguire , appeals 
from the final judgement and order of the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, the Honorable William B. Bohling, denying MOTION TO 
CORRECT SENTENCE directed at the consecutive sentence of 0-5 y e a r s 
imposed upon the conviction for the offense of Aggravated Assault, a th i rd 
degree felony, for violation of the UTAH CRIMINAL CODE, S 7b-5-103. 
Author i ty to m a k e th is appeal is given M r Maguire p u r s u a n t to S 77- l8a- l , 
(1) (b>, UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, and Rule 26 (2) (b), UTAH 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 
Jur i sd ic t ion to h e a r th i s appeal is given the Utah Court of Appeals 
th rough Rules 3 (a) and 4 (b), UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, and 
th rough S 78-2a-3, (2) (f), UTAH JUDICIAL CODE. 
i 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the t r i a l cour t imprope r ly refuse to correc t an illegally 
imposed sentence by s u m m a r i l y denying defendant ' s motion to correc t the 
sentence? 
II. Is defense counsel 's fa i lure to r a i se issue a t an imprope r and 
illegally imposed sentence, and /o r his fa i lure to f o r w a r d appeal of t h a t 
sentence, ineffective ass i s tance of counsel? 
III. Does the prohibit ion against more severe ly resentencing a 
defendant /appel lant w h o is reconvicted for the s a m e offense following a 
successful appeal p rope r ly r each the appeal f rom, and /o r the reconvict ion 
by a plea of guilty? 
IV. Is a parolee/defendant w h o w a s held w i t h o u t bail entitled to 
credi t for all the t ime he h a s served as r e su l t of the conduct upon w h i c h 
the conviction is based for w h i c h he is c u r r e n t l y being sentenced? 
V. Does the period of 4 y e a r s and 363 days of cont inuous p r e -
sentence inca rce ra t ion as r e su l t of the conduct sat isfy a conviction for a 
t h i r d degree felony? 
VI. Does due process of lav/ or the safeguards against double 
j eopa rdy b a r the imposition of an act ive sentence upon reconvict ion for the 
s a m e offense w h i c h sentence for w a s fully satisfied p r io r to an appeal 
set t ing aside t h a t p rev ious conviction? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Mr . Magui re suggests t h a t the appellate 
cour t de t e rmine and apply w h a t e v e r s t a n d a r d s a r e appropr ia te to the 
issues h e r e involved. 
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STATUTES, RULES, AMD CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
S 7fc-3-401, UTAH CRIMINAL CODE. CONCURRENT OR CONSECUTIVE 
SENTENCE LIMITATIONS. 
(1) A cour t shall de te rmine , if a defendant has been 
adjudged guil ty of m o r e t h a n one felony offense, w h e t h e r to impose 
concu r r en t of consecutive sentence for the offenses. Sentences for 
s ta te offenses shall r u n concu r r en t unless the cour t s ta tes in the 
sentence tha t t hey shall r u n cnosecutively. 
§ 76-3-402, UTAH CRIMINAL CODE. CONVICTION OF LOWER CATEGORY OF 
OFFENSE 
(1) If the cour t , having regard to the n a t u r e and 
c i r cums tances of the offense of w h i c h the defendant w a s found guilty 
and the h i s t o ry and c h a r a c t e r of the defendant, concludes tha t it 
would be u n r u l y h a r s h to record the conviction as being for tha t 
category of offense established by s ta tu te and to sentence the 
defendant to an a l t e rna t ive n o r m a l l y applicable to tha t offense, the 
court m a y , unless specifically provided by l a w , en te r a judgement of 
conviction for the next lower category of offense and impose sentence 
accordingly, 
§ 76-3-405, UTAH CRIMINAL CODE. LIMITATION ON SENTENCE WHERE 
PRIOR CONVICTION OR SENTENCE SET ASIDE. 
Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct 
r e v i e w or collateral a t t ack , the court shall not impose a n e w 
sentence for the s ame offense or for a different offense based on the 
same conduct w h i c h is more severe t h a n the pr ior sentence less the 
port ion of the sentence previous ly satisfied. 
S 76-5-103, UTAH CRIMINAL CODE. AGGRAVATED ASSAU:T. 
(1) A person is guil ty ofm Aggravated Assault if he commits 
assaul t as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intet ional ly causess ser ious bodily i n j u r y to another ; 
or 
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-
601 or o ther m e a n s or force likely to produce death or ser ious 
bodily i n j u r y . 
(2) Aggravated Assault is a t h i rd degree felony. 
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§ 77-1-6, UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURES, RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT, 
(1) In c r imina l prosecut ions the defendant is entitiled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel, 
vg) The r ight of appeal in all cases; and 
(2) In addition. 
(a) No person shal l be put twice m jeopardy for the s ame 
offense; 
S 77-32-1. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURES. MINIMUM STANDARDS • 
PROVIDED BY COUNTY FOR DEFENSE OF INDIGENT DEFENDANTS. 
The following a r e m i n i m u m s t a n d a r d s to be provided by each 
county , c i ty and t o w n for the defense of indigent persons in c r imina l 
cases m the cour t s and v a r i o u s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e bodies of the s ta te ; 
(4) Assure undivided loyal ty of defense counsel to the client, and 
(
,5) Include the taking of a f i rs t appeal of r ight and the prosecut ing 
of o ther remedies before or af ter a conviction, considered by the 
defending counsel to be in the in te res t of jus t ice except for o ther and 
subsequent d i sc re t iona ry appeals or d i sc re t iona ry w r i t proceedings. 
S 78-12-31.1, UTAH JUDICIAL CODE. POSTCONVICTION STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS 
(5) This section does not apply to motions to cor rec t a sentence 
p u r s u a n t to Rule 22, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
RULE 11, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. PLEAS 
(5) The cour t m a y refuse to accept a plea of gui l ty or no contest, 
and m a y not accept the plea unt i l the cour t h a s found' 
RULE 12, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE MOTIONS. 
(a) An application to the cour t for an order shall be made by 
motion. A motion o ther t h a n one made dur ing a t r i a l or 
hea r ing shal l be made in w r i t i n g unless the cour t o the rwise 
p e r m i t s It shall s ta te w i t h p a r t i c u l a r i t y the grounds upon 
w h i c h it is made and shall set for th the relief sought. It m a y 
be suppor ted by affidavit or by evidence. 
RULE 22, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. SENTENCE, JUDGEMENT 
ANP COMMITMENT. 
(e) The cour t m a y correc t an illegal sentence, or a sentence 
imposed in an illegal m a n n e r , at a n y t ime. 
R655-205, UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED. 
R655-205. (1) Policy. 
Effective J u l y 15, 1987, an offender shall be granted credit 
t o w a r d impr i sonmen t for a n y t ime spent m official detention on 
the c r ime of commi tment p r io r to the date the sentence w a s 
imposed, .. 
Credit for t ime served shall also be granted t o w a r d 
impr i sonmen t w h e n 
(1) A conviction is set aside and the re is a subsequent 
conviction for the same c r imina l conduct; 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ARTICLE 1, 
SECTION 7. [Due process of l aw, ] 
No person shall be deprived of life, l iber ty or p roper ty , 
w i t h o u t due process of lav/. 
SECTION 12, [Rights of the accused.] 
In all c r imina l prosecution the accused shall have the 
r igh t to appear and defend m person and by counsel; ... and the 
r ight of appeal in all cases. ... nor shall a n y person be twice 
put in j eopardy for the s ame offense. 
SECTION 24. [Uniform operation of laws . ] 
All l a w s of a general n a t u r e shal l have un i fo rm operation. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
AMENDMENT V, 
... nor shall a n y person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in j eopardy of life or limb; .. nor be deprived life, 
l iber ty , or p rope r ty , w i t h o u t due process of law; ... 
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AMENDMENT VI. 
In all c r imina l prosecut ions , the accused shal l enjoy the 
r ight ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
AMENDMENT XIV. SECTION 1. 
... no r shall a n y s ta te depr ive a n y person of life7 l iber ty , or 
p rope r ty , w i thou t due process of l aw; nor deny to a n y person 
w i t h i n i ts jur isdic t ion the equal protection of l a w s . 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is a f i rs t appeal of r ight . Mr . Maguire w a s convicted for count 
one of an amended complaint , the th i rd degree felony, Aggravated Assault, 
by a plea of no contest , successfully appealled f rom t h a t conviction via 
motion to w i t h d r a w the plea and w a s reconvicted by a plea of guil ty to 
t ha t s a m e count one. Mr . Magui re complains tha t the sentence imposed at 
the second conviction is m o r e severe t h a n the f irst setence and tha t it is 
illegally imposed p u r s u a n t to the provis ions set for th u n d e r S 76-3-405, 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE, and in violation of due process of lav/ and the double 
j eopardy provis ions of the s ta te and federal const i tut ions. He filed a pro se 
motion for an o rde r to correct the sentence and the t r i a l cour t s u m m a r i l y 
denied the motion, refusing to rect i fy the m a t t e r . Mr . Maguire a s s e r t s the 
m a t t e r s involved in MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE and denial of same , 
do subs t an t i a l ly effect h is r igh t s as defendant /appel lant . It is f rom the 
denial of t ha t motion th i s appeal is t aken . No other appeals nor challenges 
have been f o r w a r d e d w i t h respect to th i s conviction and sentence. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. While on parole from a 1973 conviction for m u r d e r II, (R.266 p. 11) 
Mr . Maguire w a s a r r e s t e d dur ing the e a r l y morn ing h o u r s of December 3, 
1937, (R.265 p 34) following an incident dur ing w h i c h his g randmothe r , 
Clarice F a r m e r , suffered in jur ies w h i c h included damage to he r r ight ea r 
lobe. (R. 31-33) M r Maguire w a s booked into the S.L. Co. Jail in a severe ly 
intoxicated condition (R.266 p.7 L.13; R.265 p.39 L.19-p.40 L.4) and charged 
w i t h m a y h e m and parole violation. CR.265 p. 34; R.266 p. 11) No bail w a s 
set. On December 7, 1987, Mr . Maguire w a s formal ly charged by complaint 
in the Fifth Circuit Court w i t h Aggravated Assault , a th i rd degree felony, 
and w i t h M a y h e m , a second degree felony. A "no bail reques t" w a s put in 
place at this t ime. tV{R.31-33) On December 10, 1987, Mr . Maguire w a s 
r e t u r n e d to custody in the Utah State Prison pending disposition of the 
c r imina l charges and parole revocation. (R.265 p.34) & 
2, On April 21, 1988, Mr . Maguire entered a plea of no contest to 
count one of the informat ion amended J a n u a r y 21, 1988, (R.31-33, 266 L 11-17) 
and w a s convicted for the t h i rd degree felony, Aggravated Assault, case no. 
J Please see the original complaint in th i s m a t t e r located somewhere 
be tween R. 2 and R. 30. A copy m a y also be found in DEFENDANT'S 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE, addendum A, 
(R.659) and addendum A here . 
2 See also: DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
CORRECT SENTENCE, (R.653-56) 
/ 
CR88-377. Granting defense motion to sentence the mat ter one degree less, 
Third District Court, Judge James S. Sawaya, did sentence Mr. Maguire to 
one year wi th credit for 30 days time served. (R.114) 
3. On June 15, 1988, before the Board of Pardons at parole violation 
hearing, Mr, Maguire did admit being convicted for the offense of 
Aggravated Assault and his parole effective October 14, 1986, w a s revoked at 
that time. (R.265 p. 54 L. 20-p.55 L.9) During the course of serving that 
sentence and parole violation for conviction for the offense of Aggravated 
Assault, on August 10, 1988, Mr. Maguire moved the trial court for its leave 
permitting him to w i t h d r a w the no contest plea. (R.124-57) On March 21, 
1989, the one year sentence for the conviction for Aggravated Assault w a s 
fully satisfied and expired. (R.114) On December 1, 1989, Third District 
Court, Judge Richard H, Moffat, denied Mr, Maguire leave to w i t h d r a w the 
plea (R.241-44, 260) and Mr. Maguire took appeal of that denial. (R.263-64) 
4. On November 16, 1990, the Utah Court of Appeals , Case No. 
9Q0Q45-CA, ruled in favor of Mr. Maguire's cause and set aside the 
conviction for the third degree felony, Aggravated Assault. The state took 
appeal and on July 9, 1991, on review of certiorari in the Utah Supreme 
Court, Case No. 900555, the judgement of the Court of Appeals setting aside 
the conviction for the third degree felony, Aggravated Assault, w a s 
affirmed. The state petitioned for rehearing and on April 10, 1992, the Utah 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the reversal of Mr, Maguire's conviction for the 
third degree felony, Aggravated Assault, and remanded the case to the trial 
court, Remittitur issued April 27, 1992. (R.535-45) 
8 
5. The case against M r Maguire r e sumed at the p r e - t r i a l level in 
the t r i a l court . On October 30, 1992, dur ing the consequent t r i a l before 
Thi rd District Court, Judge J a y Banks, Mr . Magui re offered a plea of guilty 
to count I, Aggravated Assault, as h is p a r t in an agreement w h e r e b v the 
s ta te would move to dismiss counts II and III and support Mr. Maguire ' s 
claim for t ime served since December 3, 1987. (R.625-31, R.862 L.l-8) The 
cour t took the plea of guil ty and M r Maguire w a s reconvicted for the same 
offense, Aggravated Assault, count one of the informat ion as amended 
J a n u a r y 21, 1988. (R.854 L 6-21; R.866 L.13-25; R.885 L.7-9) Approximately 30 
days la ter , on November 30, 1992, Third District Court, Judge John A. 
Rokich, imposed a n e w sentence of 0-5 y e a r s w i t h credit since April 21, 
1988, and ordered the n e w sentence to r u n consecutively to a n y previous 
act ive sentences, (R.632) 
6. On or about December 29, 1994, Mr . Maguire under took an 
effort on his own behalf to correct w h a t he believes to be an illegally 
imposed sentence m th is m a t t e r . Mr . Maguire filed w i t h the t r ia l court : 
AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY. MOTION AND ORDER TO PAY COST OF 
TRANSCRIPT, DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CORRECT 
SENTENCE, MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE, and ORDER TO CORRECT 
SENTENCE. The motion alleged tha t the second sentence is more severe 
than the f irs t and therefore in violation of S 76-3-405, UCC, as well as 
ra is ing quest ions w i t h respect to other of Mr . Magui re ' s consti tut ional 
r igh t s The motion sought as relief the cour t ' s s igna tu re on the order 
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correcting the sentence, or in the alternative, a setting for evidentiary 
hearing in the mat ter . (R.636-98) 
7 No evidentiary hearing w a s had in the matter . As per the 
signed Minute Entry, the motion to correct the sentence w a s denied bv the 
court on J a n u a r y 25, 1995, for the reason given: defendant's failure to 
forward an adequate basis for such an order. At Mr. Maguire's request 
for a final instrument in this mat ter upon which an appeal may be based, 
Third District Court, Judge William B. Bohling, executed the Minute Entry 
denying MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE on March 17, 1995. (R.765) 
8. Mr. Maguire takes appeal of Judge Bohling's s u m m a r y denial of 
MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE. (R.774-75) Mr, Maguire argues that 
imposing the sentence of 0-5 years wi th credit since April 21, 1988, 
consecutively in this mat ter w a s er ror and not properly within the 
discretion of the sentencing court. Consequently, by refusing to correct the 
illegally imposed sentence in this mat ter and by refusing him a hearing, 
Mr. Maguire alleges that the trial court has abused the discretion given it 
pursuant to Rule 22 (e), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
9. In addition to the issues raised in the trial court, on appeal Mr. 
Maguire raises ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Maguire asserts that 
his defense counsel, Manny Garcia failed to take issue at the imposition of 
the more severe sentence. Mr. Maguire asserts that he did personally 
object and promised to appeal the imposition of the more severe sentence 
and that the reason given by both the state's counsel and the court upon 
that objection to the more severe sentence w a s that he, Mr. Maguire, had 
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w i t h d r a w n his plea from a different case/offense, (R.886 L.18-R.887 L.24, R. 
882 L.8-11) Mr, Maguire a s s e r t s t h a t no w a i v e r of a n y r igh t s invested h im 
p u r s u a n t to S 76-3-405, U.C.C, w a s made and no appeal of the sentence 
w a s fo rwarded by defense counsel. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
10. The UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 22 (e), confers 
on the t r ia l court the a u t h o r i t y to correct a sentence imposed in an illegal 
m a n n e r at a n y t ime. Rule 12 (a), URCP, provides the m e a n s by wh ich a 
p a r t y m a y seek such an order from the cour t as would be requi red to 
access the relief provided u n d e r Rule 22 (e). Such a motion is made 
exceptional to the t ime l imits effecting o ther post conviction remedies 
p u r s u a n t to S 78-12-31.1, UTAH JUDICIAL CODE, and would proper ly place 
the m a t t e r back before the s ame cour t as had imposed the illegal sentence, 
Mr . Maguire a rgues t h a t he w a s p roper ly before the cour t m MOTION TO 
CORRECT SENTENCE at th i s t ime, w h i c h motion c lear ly identifies the 
sentence, the m a n n e r in w h i c h it is illegally imposed and the grounds upon 
w h i c h the motion is made . 
11. Though not ra ised in the t r i a l cour t , on appeal Mr. Maguire 
a rgues t h a t his defense counsel, M a n n y Garcia, w a s ineffective at 
sentencing on November 30, 1992. Mr, Garcia stood by and permi t ted t ha t 
effect w h i c h the defense counsels in Emm. and Chess only threa tened. Mr, 
Maguire *s counsel did not t ake issue nor f o r w a r d an appeal w h e n the more 
severe sentence w a s ac tua l ly imposed for the reconviction following a 
11 
successful appeal which had set aside the previous conviction for the same 
offense/same conduct. 
12. The statute S 76-3-405, U.C.C., is procedural due process of law 
forbidding Utah trial courts from more severely resentencing defendants 
upon reconviction for offenses from which they have previously appealled 
successfully. Mr. Maguire argues that the statute creates a liberty 
interest for those defendants who meet its criteria and qualify to be free 
from more severe resentencing. The appeal from, and/or the reconviction 
by a plea of guilty meets the statute 's requirements without being 
precluded nor speciflcly excluded from the statute 's specified and intended 
coverage or reach. 
13. Mr. Maguire argues that plea bargins in Utah are made for 
recommendations to the court and that those recommendations are not 
binding on the court as actual sentences. He argues that S76-3-405, UCC, 
does not concern itself wi th reccomendations and wha t effect they may 
have had toward the imposed sentence. He asserts that he qualifies under 
the statute and that his second sentence is in violation of § 76-3-405, UCC, 
m three ways : POINT ONE: that 0-5 years is a greater sentence that one 
year, POINT TWO: that consecutive sentencing w a s not present in the first 
sentence; POINT THREE: credit for time served since April 21, 1988, does not 
include the 30 day credit attached to the first sentence and is therefore 
more severe. Points two and three addressing elements not included m the 
first plea agreement. 
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14. A parolee/defendant is entitled to credit, against the sentence for 
all the time he has served prior to the conviction as result of the conduct 
upon which the conviction is based, Whether a right or a privilege, the 
conditional liberty of parole requires due process of law in order to revoke, 
Mr, Maguire's parole was revoked upon the finding of fact that he had 
been convicted for Aggravated Assault and for no other reasons. Mr. 
Maguire argues that he should be entitled to time served since December 3, 
1987, when he was jailed for the offense, Aggravated Assault, 
15. The sentence of 0-5 years was ordered consecutive only two 
days before Mr. Maguire would have been incarcerated for a full five 
calender years since his ar res t as result of the conduct upon which the 
conviction is based, The imposition of the consecutive component on top of 
a sentence which should have been determined already satisfied should be 
barred as multiple punishments for the same offense by the procedural and 
• i : 
substantive safeguards against double jeopardy and due process of law. 
16. The sentence originally imposed for the same offense was fully 
satisfied and expired before the fact of the appeal which set aside that 
conviction Reimposing any active sentence for the reconviction for the 
same offense should be barred as multiple punishments for the same 
offense by the procedural and substantive constitutional provisions against 
double jeopardy and due process of lav/, 
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ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT I. A TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT SUMMARILY 
REFUSE TO CORRECT AN ILLEGALLY IMPOSED 
SENTENCE UPON A PROPERLY MADE MOTION 
WHICH CLEARLY IDENTIFIES THE SENTENCE, 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES BY WHICH IT IS ILLEGAL, 
AND THE GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE MOTION 
IS MADE. 
17. Mr . Magui re f o r w a r d s Facts *6-8 beginning on page 9. A 
procedure exists w i t h i n the UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE w h e r e b y 
direct r e v i e w of an illegally imposed sentence m a y be had by beginning 
w i t h a p rope r ly made motion to correct the sentence in the s a m e court 
w h i c h imposed the sentence to begin w i t h . Rule 22 (e), UTAH RULES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, confers on the t r i a l cour t the a u t h o r i t y to cor rec t a 
sentence imposed in an lllegeal m a n n e r a t a n y t ime. 
RULE 22 
(e) The cour t m a y correc t an 
illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed 
in an illegal m a n n e r , at a n y t ime. 
(UTAH RULES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE) 
18 Rule 12 (a), URCP, provides a p a r t y w i t h the m e a n s of p roper ly 
seeking the relief provided for in Rule 22 (e) in the form of a motion seeking 
an order f rom the cour t to cor rec t the sentence. Rule 12 (a) does not 
preclude the r eques t for post judgement o rde r s , nor does it provide a n y 
t ime l imi ta t ions . 
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RULE 12, 
(a) An application to the cour t 
for an order shall be made by motion. 
A motion other t h a n one made dur ing a 
t r ia l or hear ing shall be made in 
w r i t i n g unless the cour t o the rwise 
pe rmi t s . It shall s ta te w i t h 
p a r t i c u l a r i t y the grounds upon w h i c h it 
is made and shall set forth the relief 
sought. It m a y be supported by 
affidavit or evidence, 
(UTAH RULES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.) 
19. The UTAH JUDICIAL CODE m a k e s the motion to correct sentence 
p u r s u a n t to Rule 22, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, exceptional to 
the t ime l imits res t r i c t ing w h e n other post conviction remedies m a y be 
sought: 
S 78-12-31 t 
(5) This section does not apply to 
motions to correct a sentence p u r s u a n t 
to Rule 22, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE. 
UTAH JUDICIAL CODE 
20. Mr . Magui re a rgues t ha t absent a n y t ime l imits tha t would 
r e s t r i c t w h e n a cour t m a y correct an illegal sentence, and lacking a n y 
t ime l imits t h a t would r e s t r i c t w h e n a defendant m a y seek an order from 
the cour t , then r e v i e w of the legality of an act ive sentence m a y proper ly 
be had th rough a motion to correc t an illegal sentence at a n y t ime, 
providing the issues involved have not been previous ly adjudicated. 
21. Mr . Maguire offers t ha t a question pivotal to the above 
p a r a g r a p h r e m a i n s : does the defendant, Mr . Maguire , have a n y subs tant ia l 
r igh t s , or r igh t s t ha t a r e subs tan t i a l ly effected by the disposition of the 
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motion? [see RULE 4 (b), UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, S 77-18a-
1, (1) (b), UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, and Rule 26 (2) (b), UTAH 
RULES CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ] M r Magui re a rgues t h a t an ev iden t i a ry 
hea r ing would h a v e been p roper ly in o rder m th is m a t t e r and believes tha t 
such a hea r ing would o rd ina r i l y be r equ i red bv the cour t r ev iewing the 
m a t t e r ^see S u m m e r s ^ Cook, 759 P 2d 341 (Utah App 1988) 
22 While it is w i t h m the discretion of the t r i a l cour t to correct an 
illegal sentence, M r Magui re a rgues t ha t it w a s not p rope r ly w i t h i n the 
t r ia l cou r t ' s discret ion to impose an illegal sentence in the f irs t place 
Correcting such a sentence s e rve s the in t e res t s of justice and the public 
i n t e r e s t s as wel l The cou r t ' s fa i lure to correct the sentence upon a 
p rope r ly made motion to do so m u s t be an abuse of the in ten t and 
discret ion given the cour t p u r s u a n t to RULE 22 (e), URCP 
ARGUMENT II. DEFENSE COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE 
TAKEN ISSUE AND FORWARDED APPEAL 
AT THE IMPOSITON OF THE MORE SEVERE 
SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON DEFENDANT'S 
RECONVICTION FOR THE SAME OFFENSE, 
SAME CONDUCT. 
23 M r Magui re f o r w a r d s Facts # 1-5, and # 9 beginning on page 
# 7 On November 30, 1992, M r Maguire appeared before Thi rd District 
Court, Judge John A Rokich, for sentencing At t h a t proceeding the s ta te 
w a s r ep resen ted by Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, J a m e s Cope M r 
Magui re w a s rep resen ted by defense Counsel, M a n n y Garcia (R 874; At 
t h a t t ime , the cour t did impose a sentence of 0-5 y e a r s to be se rved 
consecut ively to a n y prev ious sentences (R 632) 
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24. Mr . Garcia k n e w or should have k n o w n tha t at the first 
conviction the plea of no contest w a s entered to the offense Aggravated 
Assault, a t h i rd degree felony, count one of the informat ion as amened 
J a n u a r y 21, 1988, as w a s the plea of guil ty at the second conviction. (R.31-
33, R.266 p.8 L,11-17, R.866 L. 13-25) Mr, Garcia k n e w or should have 
k n o w n t h a t the f i rs t sentence for the same offense w a s one y e a r w i t h 
credit for 30 days . He k n e w or should h a v e k n o w n tha t the consecutive 
component had not been imposed in the f i rs t sentence, (R.114) and t ha t 
concur ren t /consecu t ive sentencing w a s no p a r t of the f irs t plea agreement . 
(R.111-12, 266) Mr . Garcia k n e w or should have k n o w n tha t the one v e a r 
sentence had been fully satisfied pr ior to the fact of the appeal wh ich had 
set aside tha t previous conviction. (R.114, 535-40) 
25. M r Garcia k n e w or should have k n o w n tha t Mr . Maguire had 
been held in custody on the basis of the conduct upon v/hich the conviction 
is based awai t ing t r i a l w i t h o u t bail, act ively serving sentence, and pending 
appeal wh i l e serv ing a parole violation for the cont inuous period of four 
y e a r s and t h r e e h u n d r e d and s ix ty th ree days , from December 3, 1987, to 
November 30, 1992. (R.879 L.24-880 L.5) That Parole violation having been 
t aken J u n e 15, 1988, based on the s ingular finding of fact t ha t Mr Maguire 
had been convicted for the offense of Aggravated Assault, case no. CR88-377, 
t h a t s ame conviction w h i c h w a s la ter set aside on appeal, (R.265 p.54 L.20-
p.55 L.9) and for w h i c h reconviction Mr . Maguire w a s then on November 
30, 1992, being resentenced. (R.266 p.8 L.11-17, R. 866L.13-25; R.885 L.7-10) 
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Mr. Garcia k n e w or should have known that Mr. Maguire's record during 
the previous 5 years of dentention w a s exemplory. (R. 653-56, 678) Mr. 
Garcia k n e w or should have known all of the above and yet did not take 
issue w i t h the more severe sentence. 
26. Mr. Maguire did take issue and personally objected to the more 
severe sentence. Upon that objection the court advised Mr. Maguire that a 
more severe sentence w a s permissable because he (Mr. Maguire) had 
w i t h d r a w n his plea in a different case. (R.886 L.18-887 L.9) 
27. There appears to be Utah caselaw in Mr. Maguire's favor 
addressing circumstances in wh ich a defendant has failed to take appeal as 
the result of defense counsel's admonitions that a more harsh penalty 
would be imposed if appeal w e r e taken and w e r e successful, [see: Chess v. 
Smili l , 617 P.2d. 341 (Utah 1980)] There appears another case w h e r e the 
defense counsel's attempts to dissuade the defendant from appeal w e r e 
unsuccessful, but the defense counsel's brief w a s later found to be such a 
shoody effort that the matter w a s given rev i ew on the merits even though 
appeal had been technically had. [see: Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d, 873 (Utah 
1990)] 
28. In the instant case, Mr. Maguire's attorney actually permitted 
the effect that the attorneys in Dunn and Chess only threatened. Mr. 
Garcia actually permitted the more severe sentence without issue and 
forwarded no appeal at all. Both the cases Chess and Dunn w e r e rev i ew of 
collateral challenges. Mr. Maguire believes that direct rev i ew is the 
preferred method for challenge. 
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ARGUMENT HI. THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS PROHIBITING 
UTAH TRIAL COURTS FROM MORE SEVERELY 
RESENTENCING DEFENDANTS UPON 
RECONVITION FOR THE SAME OFFENSE, 
SAME CONDUCT, PROVIDE SPECIFIC CRITERIA 
WHICH IS PROPERLY MET BY THE 
APPEAL FROM AND/OR THE RECONVICTION 
BY A PLEA OF GUILTY, AND DO NOT PRECLUDE 
NOR SPECIFICLY EXCLUDE THE GUILTY PLEA. 
29. Mr . Maguire f u r w a r d s Facts # l - 9 beginning on page 7. Mr . 
Maguire w a s convicted by plea of no contest to Count One of an amended 
nnmplaint , Aggravated Assault , a t h i rd degree felony. The plea w a s given 
as his p a r t in a plea ba rgm in w h i c h the s ta te moved to dismiss counts 
two and th ree and s t ipulate to a defense motion tha t the conviction be 
sentenced as though one degree less. (R.266 p.2 L,14-p.3 L.18) The t r ia l court 
did impose sentence of one yc>ar, (R 114) 
30. Subsequent ly , Mr . Maguire appealed the conviction via a motion 
in the t r ia l cour t to w i t h d r a w the no contest plea alleging amuung uther 
things, tha t the plea w a s not p roper ly t aken by the court . (R. 124-57) The 
mntinn w a ^ doniod (R 260) and M r MaguiKP tnnk appeal of t ha t denial (R. 
263-64) Upon direct r e v i e w in th i s cour t , the conviction for the th i rd 
degree felony, Aggravated Assault, w a s set aside and the m a t t e r w a s 
u l t ima te ly r emanded to the t r i a l cour t for plea w i t h d r a w a l . (R.535-40) 
" ... challenge m a y be made to a guil ty 
plea e i ther d i rec t ly or collaterally. If it 
is made direct ly , it m u s t be made m the 
context of a motion to w i t h d r a w the 
guil ty plea, the denial of w h i c h can be 
appealled. ..." 
[ S u m m e r s v Cook, 759 P. 2d 341 
(Utah App. 1988), a t 344.3 
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31. Matters resumed against Mr. Maguire in Third District Court 
at the pre trial level. On October 30, 1992, on the second day of the 
consequent trial, Mr. Maguire entered a plea of guilty to Count One of the 
amended complaint, the third degree felony, Aggravated Assault, as his part 
in a plea bargin whereby the state would move the court to dismiss Counts 
Two and Three and agree that Mr. Maguire should receive credit for all 
the time he had served in connection wi th this offense since December 3, 
1987. (R.849 L. 14-850 L.2) The mat ter was then set for sentencing on 
November 30, 1992. (R.871) 
32• At sentencing, the court imposed sentence of 0-5 years with credit 
s i n c e Apr i l 21/1988,and f u r t h e r ordered t h a t Mr. Maguire s e rve 
the remainder of t he sen tence c o n s e c u t i v e l y . ^ gg0 ^ 13-15* R 
632) Mr. Maguire asserts and forwards argument that the sentence of 0-5 
years , consecutive, wi th credit for time served since April 21, 1988, is more 
severe than the previous sentence for conviction for the same offense/same 
conduct, (R.266 p.8 L.11-17; R. 866L. 13-25; R.885 L.7-10) and therefore is in 
direct violation of Utah law pursuant to the provisions set forth under S 76-
3-405, Utah Criminal Code. 
Where a conviction or sentence 
las been set aside on direct review or 
collateral attack, the court shall not 
.mpose a new sentence for the same 
Dffense or for a different offense based 
m the same conduct which is more 
severe than the prior sentence less the 
portion of the sentence previously 
satisfied. 
76-3-405, (UTAH CRIMINAL CODE) 
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33. S 76-3-405, UCC, is procedural due process of law directed to 
Utah trial courts forbidding them from more severely resentencing 
defendants who meet and satisfy the specific requirements set forth by the 
statute. Mr, Maguire argues that although the statute is directed to the 
courts, a liberty interest of constitutional magnitude is created for those 
defendants who meet the statute 's criteria and qualify to be free from 
more severe resentencing. Just as inmates in Montana and Nebraska are 
the beneficiaries of a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole 
grant invested by the statutes directed to their parole boards and governing 
parole grants, and are given protection under Amendment XIV, [see: Board 
of Pardons v. Allen. 107 S.Ct. 2415 (1987)], S 76-3-405, U.C.C., must create at 
least the same level of protection under Amendment XIV. Mr. Maguire 
asks if whether Article 1, Section 7, 12, & 24, Constitution of Utah, may 
provide even more protection for the defendant in Utah who would qualify 
under the Utah statute to be free from more severe resentencing. 
34. Mr. Maguire's circumstances meet and fulfill the criteria set 
forth in the statute. The first conviction was set aside on direct review. 
Both convictions were for the third degree felony, Aggravated Assault, 
count one of the information, (R.266 p.8 L.11-17; R. 866L. 13-25, R.885 L.7-10) 
Both were for the permanent disfigurement of the victom's ear by use of 
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such means or force as likely to produce serious bodily injury. ^ ( R . 111-12, 
625-31) The mere fact that the conviction(s) resulted from a guilty plea 
appears indistinguishable from any other conviction as seen through the 
statute's language. If it is the intent of the statute to preserve and protect 
the convicted's right to a p p e a l ^ by divesting the state's arsenal of the 
threat of a more severe penalty if appeal is successfully taken, then that 
protection must be in all cases pursuant to the provisions set forth under 
S 77-1-6, UCCP, and Utah's o w n constitution, Article 1, Section 12. 
S 77-1-6, RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the 
defendant is entitiled: 
(g) The right of appeal in 
all cases; and 
UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURES. 
SECTION 12. [Rights of the accused,] 
In all criminal prosecution the 
accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel; ... 
and the right of appeal in all cases. ... 
nor shall any person be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense. 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, UCA 
3 In addendum Mr Maguire offers; A, the original information dated 
December 7, 1987; B. the amended information dated January 21, 1988; C. 
Affidavit of Defendant, 1988; D. commitment, 1988; E. Affidavit of 
Defendant, 1992; and F. commitment, 1992. 
4 See: £tea&, Dunn, Mitchell, and SorenSPH 
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35, In S u m m e r s v. Cook, 759 P,2d 341 (Utah App, 1988), a case 
dealing w i t h the r e v i e w of a collateral challenge to a guil ty plea, th is court 
s tated t ha t the fa i lure of a defendant to t ake appeal from the denial of a 
motion to w i t h d r a w guil ty plea would o rd ina r i ly be conclusive. The court 
then provides the exception and re fe rs to a case w h e r e the basis for 
grant ing r e v i e w w a s the defense counsel 's m i s t aken admonit ion to the 
defendant t ha t he, the defendant, could receive a more severe penal ty if 
appeal w e r e made successfully. This would seem to speak to this appellant 
tha t 76-3-405 m a y apply to the appealled motion to w i t h d r a w a guil ty as in 
the in s t an t case. 
... However, w h e r e the fai lure to appeal 
from the denial of the motion is due to 
counsel 's omission or o ther good cause, , . . 
E.g., Chess v. Smith. 
S u m m e r s v, Cook, 759 P.2d at 345 
(Utah App. 1988) 
36. Only having been found faul ty , wil l a plea be set aside on 
appellate r e v i e w . Those defendant ' s w i t h frivolous or mer i t less causes wil l 
not r e q u i r e protection u n d e r S 76-3-405, (UCC). And for those w i t h 
mer i to r ious c la ims and w h o preva i l on appeal, S 76-3-405, (UCC), does not 
l imit a prosecutor f rom pur su ing a n y more egregious charges w h i c h m a y 
h a v e been dismissed as p a r t of the n o w voided plea agreement . And should 
a more ser ious charge sus ta in a conviction, § 76-3-405, (UCC), only l imits 
sentences for those based on the same c r imina l conduct. In the ins t an t 
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m a t t e r , the s ta te had t w o opportuni t ies to p u r s u e a g rea te r conviction but 
failed to do so on both occations. (R.885 L.7-10) 
37 POINT ONE: 0 - 5 y e a r s i s a g r e a t e r s e n t e n c e t h a t o n e 
y e a r . In i ts m e m o r a n d a in responce to th is cour t s Rule 10 (e) motions in 
th i s m a t t e r , the s ta te has fo rwarded a r g u m e n t tha t Mr . Magui re should be 
excepted f rom protection u n d e r S 76-3-405 because the lessor sentence of 
one y e a r for the conviction for a t h i r d degree felony w a s the r e su l t of a 
plea deal. The s t a t e ' s reasoning is t ha t Mr , Maguire w i t h d r e w his plea, 
and therefore w i t h d r e w from the deal as wel l . Rightfully then , the par t ies 
should r e t u r n to the i r f o rmer positions, (see Addendum G) 
38 Fi rs t , M r . Magui re a rgues t ha t he did not m e r e l y w i t h d r a w his 
no contest plea. He did so move, but the t r i a l cour t denied h im. (R.260) 
Had the t r i a l cour t g ran ted Mr . Maguire leave to w i t h d r a w the plea, then 
Mr . Magui re would have no claim u n d e r S 76-3-405. That did not occur, 
h o w e v e r . 
39. Next, Mr . Magui re a s k s th is cour t to consider the n a t u r e and 
effect of the plea barg in in th i s m a t t e r . The deal w a s for a r ecom-
mendat ion for the sentence of a class A misdemeanor . (R. 266 p.2 L.14-p.3 
L.10) The deal w a s fully realised w h e n the s ta te fo rwarded the agreed 
upon recommenda t ion , regard less of the sentence to be ac tua l ly imposed. 
[See State v . T h u r s t o n . 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah App, 1989) w h e r e th is cour t held 
t h a t the fa i lure of a t r i a l cour t to sentence as per a plea agreement w a s 
insufficient cause to set aside the conviction.] As manda ted by State v 
Gibbons. 740 P. 2d 1309 (Utah 1987), and as w a s T h u r s t o n advised, Mr . 
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Maguire w a s advised by the court tha t the plea deal w a s not binding on 
the cour t . (R.266 p.5 L.6-13) 
40 The cour t w a s not bound by the agreement P u r s u a n t to the 
provisions set for th unde r Rule 11 (5), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE, the cour t w a s not requi red to accept the no contest plea at alL 
However, the plea w a s t aken and a sentence of one y e a r w a s imposed. 
(R 114) 
RULE 11, 
(5) The cour t m a y refuse to accept a 
plea of guil ty or no contest, and m a y not 
accept the plea unt i l the cour t has 
found: 
UTAH RULES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 
41, Mr . Maguire a rgues t ha t S 76-3-405 does not p r e sume to limit 
w h a t e v e r recommenda t ions m a y be fo rwarded by the par t ies . Nor does 
the s t a tu t e consider the effect tha t a n y such recommendat ions m a y have 
had or not had on the cour t a t sentencing. The s t a tu te is directed to the 
sentencing cour t s and l imits only legal sentences, [See: State v. BabbeL 813 
P. 2d 8b (Utah 1991) w h e r e a s t a t u t o r y sentence w a s permi t ted in place of a 
lessor illegal sentence.] and only those sentences w h i c h a r e ac tua l ly 
imposed, [see State v . C u r r v , 814 P,2d 1150 (Utah Appl. Crt 1991) w b p r ? thp 
lessor f i rs t sentence w a s neve r ac tua l ly imposed.] 
42. Mr . Magui re ' s f i rs t sentence of one y e a r for the th i rd degree 
felony conviction, Aggravated Assault, w a s legal p u r s u a n t to S 76-5-103 and 
S 76-3-402, and t h a t sentence w a s ac tua l ly imposed and e x e c u t e . (P. 114) 
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S 76-5-103, AGGRAVATED ASSAUjT-
(1) A person is gui l ty of 
Aggravated*Assault if he commi t s 
assau l t as defined in Section 76-5-102 
and he: 
(a) intet ional ly causess ser ious 
bodily i n j u r y to ano ther ; or 
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as 
defined in Section 76-1-601 or o ther 
m e a n s or force l ikely to produce death 
or ser ious bodily i n j u r y 
(2) Aggravated Assault is a th i rd 
degree felony 
S 76-3-402, CONVICTION OF LOWER 
CATEGORY OF OFFENSE. 
(1) If the cour t , having regard 
to the n a t u r e and c i r cums tances of the 
offense of w h i c h the defendant w a s 
found guil ty and the h i s to ry and 
c h a r a c t e r of the defendant, concludes 
tha t it would be u n r u l y h a r s h to record 
the conviction as being for t ha t category 
of offense established by s t a tu t e and to 
sentence the defendant to an a l t e rna t i ve 
n o r m a l l y applicable to t ha t offense, the 
cour t m a y , unless specifically provided 
by l a w , en te r a judgement of conviction 
for the next lower category of offense 
and impose sentence accordingly. 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE. 
43. Were S 76-3-405, (UCC), to t ake into account the effect upon the 
cour t of r ecommenda t ions , it would probably take into account the basis 
for those r ecommenda t ions as wel l . In th is m a t t e r , the v ic tom's own 
w i s h e s or recommenda t ion , w h i c h images the p rosecu tor ' s recommendat ion 
to the cour t t h rough the plea agreement , w a s fo rwarded to the cour t 
t h rough the prosecutor at the f i rs t sentencing w i t h the victom present in 
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the courtroom (R.266 p. 12 L.3-16) It is not unreasonable to assume that the 
victom's wishes had as great an effect on the court as did the plea agree-
ment; and it w a s probably as much the basis for the state's recom-
mendation as was the plea bargining process. 
44, Likewise, the second sentence of 0-5 years , consecutive, may be 
seen as much the result of Mr. Maguire's appeal and plea wi thdrawal 
from the original conviction as for any reason which may be forwarded 
and weighed at this point in time. (R. 886 L. 18-887 L.9) The state's recom-
mendations at the second sentencing appear to have been based upon that 
fact. (R.876 L.17-878 L.25; R.882 L.4-11) # 7 The only other reason present 
for the severity of the second sentence is the fact of Mr. Maguire's bad 
record, (R.883 L. 17-21) and because he had entered the guilty plea during 
the trial (R.882 L 4-13) However, the fact of Mr. Maguire's bad record 
was known and considered by the court at the first sentence. (R 266 p. 12 
L.22-25) Is the guilty plea during trial as opposed to any other time a 
legally substantial reason for a more severe sentence? 
45 Perhaps the more poignant argument for applying S 76-3-405 in 
this mat ter follows; 
5 Mr. Maguire asks this court to note that at the second sentencing the 
prosecutor misadvised the court with respect to Mr. Maguire having 
entered a plea to a class A misdemeanor 4 years earlier Cope may have 
been mislead by the scribblings on the Amended Information as shown here 
in Addendum B,, forgetting that he and Manny Garcia had made and 
initialled those scribblings in 1992. Mr. Garcia did not appear as counsel 
until 1992 (R. 554) 
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46, POINT TWO: t h a t c o n s e c u t i v e s e n t e n c i n g w a s n o t 
p r e s e n t i n t h e f i r s t s e n t e n c e . The Utah Supreme Court h a s held t h a t 
8 76-3-405 prohib i t s the t r ad ing off of components in the sentence. [See: 
State v . Sorenson. 639 P. 2d 179 (Utah 1981)] The s t a t e ' s a r g u m e n t t h a t Mr . 
Magu i re ' s f i rs t sentence w a s the r e su l t of a n o w voided plea ag reement 
(Addendum G) does not r e ach th i s point a s r e v i e w of all the pe r t inen t 
record wi l l c lea r ly revea l t h a t concur ren t / consecu t ive sentencing w a s no 
p a r t of the plea agreement . (R. 266) The issue is mentioned in the record 
only in p a r a g r a p h # 7 , Affidavit of defendant . (R.111-13) P u r s u a n t to S 76-3-
401 a n y s ta te sentence in Utah not specified in the sentence as consecutive 
is au tomat i c ly concu r r en t . 
S 76-3-401, CONCURRENT OR 
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE LIMITATIONS. 
(1) A cour t shal l de t e rmine , if a 
defendant h a s been adjudged gui l ty of 
m o r e t h a n one felony offense, w h e t h e r 
to impose c o n c u r r e n t of consecutive 
sentence for the offenses. Sentences for 
s t a te offenses shall r u n c o n c u r r e n t 
unless the cour t s t a t e s in the sentence 
tha t t h e y shal l r u n cnosecutively. 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE. 
47. This cour t h a s pe rmi t t ed the exception to th i s facet of S 76-3-
405 in State v . Mitchell . 824 P.2d 469 (Utah App. 1991), a case w h e r e 1-15 
y e a r s w i t h fine and gun e n h a n c e m e n t w a s put in place of the original 5 
y e a r s to life. This c o u r t ' s reasoning w a s t h a t the fine and gun 
e n h a n c e m e n t w e r e not avai lable in the f i rs t sentence, and t h a t even w i t h 
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those components, the second sentence, in total, was still less severe than 
was the first sentence, 
48. In the instant matter , the first sentence of one year could have 
been imposed consecutively, and by no stretch of any reasoning may the 
second sentence of 0-5 years , consecutive to a previous life sentence be 
determined as less severe that one year, concurrent 
49. Mr. Maguire here stipulates that at the fact of the guilty plea 
before Third District Court, Judge Jay Banks, on November 30, 1992, the 
court did admonish him as part of the Rule 11 requirements that he could 
receive a consecutive sentence as result of his plea of guilty. (R 859 L. 14-861 
L.4, 865 L.7-25) However, any conviction could be given a consecutive 
sentence whether by j u r y trial, bench trial, or as in the instant case, by 
plea. Mr. Maguire argues that Rule 11, URCP., does not take into account 
the special rights afforded a defendant wi th the specific circumstances 
defined by S 76-3-405, U.C.C., and who would qualify for protection under 
the statute. Mr. Maguire asserts that the court made no admonition 
whatsoever wi th respect to any rights conferred under S 76-3-405, U.C.C., 
and a most substantial package of rights they be to any who may need and 
qualify for them. Nor, as Mr. Maguire further asserts, did his defense 
counsel advise him in that respect. Did Mr. Maguire then waive rights 
that he may not have even known were his? 
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50 POINT THREE: c r e d i t for t i m e s e r v e d s i n c e Apri l 21 , 
1988, d o e s n o t i n c l u d e t h e 30 d a y c r e d i t a t t a c h e d to t h e f i r s t 
s e n t e n c e a n d i s t h e r e f o r e m o r e s e v e r e . S 76-3-405 also r e q u i r e s t h a i 
the defendant receive full credit for the t ime he h a s se rved on the previous 
sentence. The s ta te a rgues in i t ' s MEMORANDUM IN RESPONCE TO COURT'S 
SECOND SUA SPONTE MOTION FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE tha t Mr . 
Magui re did receive full credit for t ime served (Addendum G) M r 
Magui re a s s e r t s and a rgues t ha t he did not receive the full credit to w h i c h 
the s t a t u t e enti t les h im, 
51. At the second sentence the cour t gave credit f rom the date of 
the original conviction, April 21, 1988 (R.880 L. 13-16) The original sentence 
imposed on t h a t day in 1988 include a credit for 30 days t ime served. CR. 
114) That credit is not present in the second sentence The credit w a s 
g ran ted u n d e r objection from the s ta te at the f i rs t sentence (R.266 p. 15 L.18-
24) and taken a w a y w i t h the approval of the s ta te at the second sentence 
(R. 877 L.22-25) ft) 
52. Not only did the cour t more severe ly resentence Mr , Maguire 
by leaving out the 30 day credi t w h i c h had been placed m the pr ior 
sentence, but even t h a t f i rs t sentence did not provide M r Maguire w i t h 
credi t for all the t ime served to w h i c h he should have been entitled and 
credited, 
6 M r Magui re a s k s th is cour t to take notice tha t the s t a t e ' s position 
w i t h respect to t ime served at the second sentence is at odds w i t h the 
ag reemen t by w h i c h the second p l e a was e n t e r e d . (R.862 L . l - 8 ) 
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ARGUMENT IV. TIME SERVED AWAITING DISPOSITION 
OF PAROLE VIOLATION AND CRIMINAL 
CHARGES, AND TIME ACTIVELY SERVED 
AS RESULT OF A PAROLE VIOLATION BASED 
ON A CRIMINAL CONVICTION WITH CONCURRENT 
SENTENCE WHICH IS LATER SET ASIDE, SHOULD 
BE CREDITED AGAINST THE SENTENCE IMPOSED 
FOR (re)CONVICTION BASED ON THE SAME 
CONDUCT. 
53. The s ta te has argued in memos in response to this cour t ' s ru le 
10 (e) motions t ha t Mr . Maguire ra ised only the issue of a more severe 
sentence in his MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE filed in the t r i a l court . 
^Addendum G) Mr . Maguire disagrees and directs th is cour t f i rs t to 
p a r a g r a p h *9, MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE, (R.638) Specifically, the 
last sentence a t bottom: "By sentencing th is defendant in th is m a n n e r , th is 
cour t is in direct violation of the s t a tu te S 76-3-405 (UCC) and has deprived 
Mr . Maguire the benefits of his const i tut ional ly given r ight to due process 
of l a w , Article 1, Section 7 (UCA) as wel l as ra is ing questions w i t h respect 
to o the rs of Mr . Magui re ' s const i tut ional r igh t s (i.e., double jeopardy). 
, 54. P a r a g r a p h # 7 on tha t s ame page (R.638) direct ly re fe rs the 
court to f u r t h e r informat ion to be found in DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE. (R.653-56) That document ' s 
sole in ten t is to demons t r a t e t h a t Mr . Maguire ha s been incarcera ted since 
his a r r e s t on December 3, 1987, and tha t no o ther convictions have uuuurr^d 
since then , n i e the r in cour t , no r before the board of pardons w h i c h m a y 
effort a de te rmina t ion of w h a t is ac tua l ly the cause for th is c u r r e n t 
incarcera t ion . The document does argue for t ime served since December 3, 
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1987, and w a s filed in the t r i a l cour t w i t h the MOTION TO CORRECT 
SENTENCE. Both the MOTION and the AFFIDAVIT a r e subscr ibed and s w o r n 
to, (R.640, 656) 
55. As RELIEF SOUGHT in MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE (R.639) 
the motion seeks an ev iden t i a ry hea r ing as a l t e rna t ive to correct ing the 
sentence. No e v i d e n t i a r y hear ing w a s permi t t ed in th i s m a t t e r . The issue 
of t ime served w a s ra ised before the cour t a t the f i rs t sentencing. (R 266 
p. 15 L.2-24) The issue w a s ac tua l ly an element of the second plea bargin. 
(R.862 L.l-8) M r . Magui re p r a y s this cour t to see tha t the issue is ra ised 
sufficiently m MOTION and AFFIDAVIT to p e r m i t th is cour t to r e v i e w the 
record and the t r i a l cou r t ' s de te rmina t ion w i t h respect to t ime served. 
56. Mr . Magui re f o r w a r d s Facts # l - 9 beginning on page # 7 . While 
on parole on December 3, 1987, Mr . Magui re w a s a r r e s t e d in the a p a r t m e n t 
of his g r a n d m o t h e r , Clarice F a r m e r , following an incident dur ing w h i c h 
she suffered i n j u r y including h a r m to h e r r igh t ea r lobe, Mr . Magui re 
w a s booked into the Salt Lake Co. Jai l and charge w i t h m a y h e m and parole 
violation. On December 10, 1987, he w a s r e t u r n e d to pr ison pending 
disposition of the c r imina l charges and parole violation. (R. 265 p.34) On 
April 21, 1988, he w a s convicted in cour t by plea to the offense of 
Aggravated Assault and sentence w a s imposed. (R.114) Consequently, on 
J u n e 15, 1988, h is parole effective October 14, 1986, w a s revoked upon the 
s ingula r finding of fact t h a t he had been convicted for the offense of 
Aggravated Assault . (R.265 p.54 L.20-p.55 L.13; R.653-56) 
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57. The U,S, Supreme Court h a s extended Amendment Four teenth 
of the U.S. consti tut ion to the parole revocation process in Mor r i s sev v. 
B r e w e r . 92 U.S. 2593 (1972). 
"We see, therefore , t ha t the l iber ty 
of a parolee al though inde te rmina te , 
includes m a n y of the core va lues of 
unqualified l iber ty and its t e rmina t ion 
inflicts a "grievous loss" on the parolee 
and often on o thers . It is h a r d l y useful 
a n y longer to t r y to deal w i t h th is 
problem in t e r m s of w h e t h e r the 
parolee 's l iber ty is a "right" or a 
"privilege". By w h a t e v e r name , the 
l iber ty is va luable and m u s t be seen as 
w i t h i n the protection of the Four teenth 
Amendment . I t 's t e rmina t ion calls for 
some o rde r ly process, howeve r 
informal " 
Mor r i s sev v. Brewer , 92 S. Ct. 
a t 2601 (1972) 
58. Mr . Maguire acknowledges tha t he w a s afforded process in 
accord w i t h the r e q u i r e m e n t s of the Four teenth Amendment and w i t h the 
Ufpih Code of Criminal Procedures w h i c h reflect the Mor r i s sev court . 
Through t ha t process, it w a s de termined t ha t Mr . Magui re ' s parole w a s 
revoked due to the conviction for the offense of Aggravated Assault w h i c h 
occurred on April 21, 1988, and for no other reasons . (R.879 L.24-880 L.l; 
R,563-56) 
59. In the i n s t an t case, Mr . Maguire w a s neve r granted a bail. His 
presentence inca rce ra t ion w a s u n d e r a no bail reques t . (R.31-33) Exclude 
all o ther considerat ions including Mr . Magui re ' s parole hold s t a tu s , and he 
would still have been in jai l f rom December 3, 1987, th rough April 21, 1988, 
u n d e r th is offense. Subsequent to the original conviction for the offense, 
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Aggravated Assault , he w a s u n d e r ac tua l sentence from the cour t and 
serv ing parole violation t aken s ingu la r ly from the fact of t ha t conviction 
for Aggravated Assault , and then l a te r pending disposition of the appeal and 
then disposition of the r e m a n d e d charges . All the above for the conduct for 
w h i c h he w a s jailed and upon w h i c h the conviction is based for w h i c h Mr . 
Magui re w a s sentenced on November 30, 1992, to a t e r m of 0-5 y e a r s , 
consecutive to a life sentence, only t w o days before he would h a v e claim to 
a full five ca lendar y e a r s a l r eady served as direct r e su l t of t h a t same 
conduct. (R.653-56) 
60. The mode rn t r end in l a w appea r s to be t ha t a defendant should 
receive credit t o w a r d the sentence for all the t ime he spends inca rce ra ted 
as r e su l t of the conduct upon w h i c h a conviction is based. See: State v, 
Richards , 740 P, 2d 1314 (Utah 1987), at 1317, for examples of the MODEL 
PENAL CODS and the ABA gTANPARPS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE. The Utah 
S u p r e m e Court did not adopt so broad a ru l e but ru led instead t ha t 
p u r s u a n t to the equal protection clause Richards w a s entit led to full credit 
against h is sentence for t ime served prev ious to his conviction because he 
w a s unable to post bail. 
61. Mr . Magui re notes t h a t the cour t in Richards does not consider 
the UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE w h i c h s ta tes in the pe r t inen t pa r t : 
R655-205. (1) Policy, 
Effective J u l y 15, 1987, an offender 
shal l be granted credi t t o w a r d 
impr i sonmen t for a n y t ime spent in 
official detention on the c r ime of 
c o m m i t m e n t p r io r to the date the 
sentence w a s imposed, ... 
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Credit for t ime served shal l also be 
granted t o w a r d impr i sonmen t w h e n : 
(1) A conviction is set aside and 
the re is a subsequent conviction for the 
same c r imina l conduct; 
R655-205. (1), UTAH 
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
62. Mr , Maguire he r e m a k e s the same a r g u m e n t w i t h respect to 
the creat ion of a l iber ty in te res t as appea r s in the preceedmg p a r a g r a p h 
# 33 , Here, a defendant is given the r ight to receive full credit for t ime 
served if he meets the specified c r i t e r i a put for th by the Code, 
63. In Nor th Carolina v> P?arQ?> 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L Ed 
2d 656 (1969), the United States Supreme Court held t ha t the double jeopardy 
clause is violated w h e n p u n i s h m e n t a l r eady exacted for an offense is not 
fully credited in imposing sentence for a n e w conviction for the same 
offense. The Supreme Court held in Pearce t ha t a person requ i red to se rve 
a m a x i m u m sentence af ter p r io r incarcera t ion for the s ame offense wil l 
h a v e received mut ip le p u n i s h m e n t s for the s ame offense. The court 
emphasized t ha t the same principle obviously holds t r u e w h e n e v e r 
p u n i s h m e n t a l r eady endured is not fully sub t rac ted from a n y sentence 
imposed. (Pearce at 665) The Supreme Court made no distinction between 
jail and s ta te pr ison. 
64. At the sentencing on November 30, 1992, w h e n the consecutive 
component w a s added to the sentence, (R.632) Mr , Maguire a s se r t s he had 
been inca rce ra ted for the cont inuous period of 4 y e a r s and 363 days , from 
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December 3, 1987, to November 30, 1992. (R.653-56) Mr . Magui re a rgues t ha t 
even the m o r e severe sentence of 0-5 y e a r s for the reconvict ion for the 
offense, Aggravated Assault , w a s a l r e a d y effectively an expired sentence at 
t h a t point in t ime -when the consecutive component w a s added. Such a 
sentencing is s u r e l y imposing mul t ip le p u n i s h m e n t s for the s ame offense 
and violates due process of lav/ and the provis ions against double jeopardy . 
ARGUMENT V PRAYER FOR TWO DAYS OF GRACE. 
TIME OFF FOR GOOD BEHAVIOR. 
65. Mr . Magui re f o r w a r d s facts # l - 9 beginning on page # 7 . He h a s 
no a r g u m e n t to offer he re . He s t ipula tes t h a t even given full credi t for all 
h is p resen tence inca rce ra t ion t h a t on November 30, 1992, he still owed t w o 
days on the full t e r m of the 0-5 y e a r sentence. He a s k s th i s cour t to 
examine the documents w h i c h a r e presented in Addendum I, DEFENDANT'S 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE. (R 678 ?) These 
documents d e m o n s t r a t e an a lmost perfect record of good behavior and a 
tolerable level of men ta l s tabi l i ty over the 4 y e a r s and 363 days of 
presen tence inca re ra t ion . 
66. M r . Magui re p r a y s for t w o d a y s grace in w h a t e v e r form the 
cour t m a y deem fit and appropr ia t e to g ran t? 
ARGUMENT VI. THE IMPOSITION OF AN ACTIVE SENTENCE 
UPON RECONVICTION FOR AN OFFENSE, 
THE PREVIOUS CONVICTION FOR THE SAME 
OFFENSE HAVING BEEN SET ASIDE SUBSEQUENT 
TO THE FULL SERVICE OF THE ORIGINALLY 
IMPOSED SENTENCE, IS IMPOSING MULTIPLE 
PUNISHMENTS FOR THE SAME OFFENSE AND 
SHOULD BE BARRED BY THE PROVISIONS 
AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY. AND By DUE PROCESS. 
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67. The s ta te ha s expressed in its memos in respose to th i s cour t ' s 
Rule 10 (e> motions a misunders tand ing w i t h respect to th is issue. 
(Addendum G) Mr . Maguire does not contend m e r e l y tha t the more severe 
sentence should be b a r r e d by the double j eopardy clause. Rather , the f i rs t 
sentence m th is m a t t e r w a s not vacated on appeal. That sentence of one 
y e a r w i t h credit for 30 days imposed on April 21, 1988, w a s fully satisfied 
and finished w i t h on M a r c h 20, 1989, in full compliance w i t h the order of 
the sentencing court . (R.114) 
68. Mr . Maguire f o r w a r d s facts # l - 9 beginning on page # 7 . No 
s t ay s w e r e sought w i t h respect to the execution of the sentence. None 
w e r e granted. M r Maguire did file a motion to w i t h d r a w the contest plea 
upon w h i c h the conviction w a s based in August, 1988, R. 124-57.) but no 
s t a y w a s sought nor granted on the basis of t ha t motion, and the m a t t e r 
w a s still pending before the t r i a l court w h e n on M a r c h 21, 1989, the 
sentence ac tua l ly expired. (R.241-44; 260) 
69. Mr . Magui re h e r e a rgues tha t it is m o r e t h a n mere ly a m a t t e r 
of receiving credi t for each day ac tua l ly served. The f irst sentence w a s 
completed. No n e w active sentence at all, nor a n y portion of an active 
sentence should be permi t ted in th i s m a t t e r t ha t is not b a r r e d by the 
double j eopardy clause, Amendment V, and the due process and equal 
protect ions clauses, Amendment XIV, of the federal consti tution. 
Ex Par te Lange, 18 Wall, at 163, 
21 L. Ed. at 878 (1873) 
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"... The Constitution w a s designed as 
m u c h to p r even t the c r i m i n a l being 
punished for the s ame offense as f rom 
being twice t r ied for it." 
fEx Par te Lange, 18 Wall at 163, 21 L. Ed 
a t 878 (1873)] 
70. M r Maguire a sks th is cour t w h e t h e r or not the s a m e or more 
protection m a y be provided u n d e r Utah ' s Article 1, Sections 7, 12, & 24? 
IN SUMMATION 
§ 7 6 - 3 - 4 0 5 / UCC, i s i n t e n d e d t o p r o t e c t t h e c o n v i c t e d 1 s 
r i g h t t o a p p e a l . U t a h ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n g i v e s t h e r i g h t t o 
a p p e a l t o a l l c a s e s . 
71. Mr . Maguire w a s convicted for the s a m e offense, Aggravated 
Assault , count I of an informat ion amended J a n u a r y 21, 1988, consequent to 
the f i rs t conviction having been set aside on direct r e v i e w . The sentence 
imposed upon the second conviction is more severe t h a n the f i rs t : 1) 0-5 
y e a r s is g rea t e r t h a n one y e a r ; 2) consecutive is g rea te r t h a n c o n c u r r e n t ; 
3) the second sentence does not include the 30 credi t w h i c h w a s p resen t in 
the f i rs t sentence; 4) n i e the r f i rs t nor second sentence provides the full 
t ime se rved credi t t h a t is due; and 5) The f i rs t sentence in th is m a t t e r 
w a s not set aside. It w a s fully se rved and satisfied before the fact of 
appeal. The price odered by the cour t w a s fully paid. The f i rs t sentence of 
one y e a r m a y be seen as the r e su l t of a n o w voided plea barg in even 
though the t e r m s of tha t ag reement specified tha t the deal would not be 
binding on the cour t . However , i t ems 2, 3 and 4 w e r e no p a r t of t h a t 
ag reement . 
72. Defense cousel w a s ineffective in th is m a t t e r . Even so, The 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 22 (e), provides its o w n r e m e d y for 
a n i m p r o p e r l y imposed sentence exclusive of a n y t ime l imi ta t ions . S 76-3-
405, UCC, es tabl ishes sentencing l imi ta t ions w h i c h apply u n d e r ce r t a in 
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conditions, and it provides specific criteria which is meet by the appeal 
from and/or the reconviction by a plea of guilty. S 76-3-405 would not 
appear to reach the reconviction consequental to writ or Motion to 
Withdraw a guilty plea which has been granted at the trial court level, 
Only the successful appeal from a trial court's denial of writ or motion 
would even anticipate need of S 76-3-405, and only meritorious claims will 
have prevailed on appeal, Upon reconviction, only those for the same 
offense/same conduct will meet the statutes criteria. It does not limit 
recommendations by parties, and courts may refuse to accept a guilty plea. 
CONCLUSION 
73. For the reasons set forth in the foregoing arguments Mr. 
Maguire requests that the sentences of 0-5 years, consecutive, be vacated 
or modified to provide for a properly served and fully expired sentence, 
and/or that this court should order whatever additional and/or alternative 
relief that is deemed appropriate and fitting in this matter. Such 
alternative relief might properly include an order vacating the trial court's 
denial of Mr. Maguire's MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE remanding this 
matter back to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing of the facts and 
issues forwarded in this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ZLIiay of £ ^X>rKJ^C^V^JL , 1995. t 
Brian Maguire, Appellant, Defendant, 
attorney pro se. 
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ADDENDUM A 
JA&ESm* COPE 
Deputy County Attorney 
Courtside Office Building 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Screened by: J. Cope 
Assigned to: Special Victim 
BAIL: NO BAIL 
INFORMATION 
Criminal No. 
87.ioiJW . FS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BRIAN E. MAGUIRE DOB 8/25/48, 
Defendantfs). 
y^p. I&IWPJMA 7fi7^rm/h(i>n/t7? 
The undersigned Officer John E. Foster - SLCPD underoath 
states on information and belief that the defendantfs) committed the 
crimes of: 
COUNT I 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, at 1966 South 200 East 
A606, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about 
December 3, 1987, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 103, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that 
the defendant, BRIAN E. MAGUIRE, a party to the offense, 
assaulted Clarice Farmer, and intentionally caused serious 
bodily injury to Clarice Farmer, by the use of such means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury; 
COUNT II 
MAYHEM, a Second Degree Felony, at 1966 South 200 East A606, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about December 3, 1987, in 
violation of Title 
Annotated 1953, as 
MAGUIRE, a party 
Clarice Farmer by 
Clarice Farmer of a 
76, Chapter 5, Section 105, Utah Code 
amended, in that the defendant, BRIAN E. 
to the offense, committed mayhem upon 
unlawfully and intentionally depriving 
member of her body, to-wit: Ear; 
fContinued on page 2) 
NO BAIL REQUEST: The defendant BRIAN E. MAGUIRE is currently on 
parol from the Utah State Prison for another felony. 
Therefore, pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Utah 
Constitution, it is requested that the defendant be held 
without bail on the above charge, 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Scott Walton Kelly Kent Sgt. Calvin Crockett John E. Foster 
Clarice Farmer Colleen Maguire Marvin Davis Dr. Lillian 
Grant Dr. Daniel Sellers 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant relies upon the following in asserting the 
above charges: 
1. Statement of Clarice Farmer, the eighty-plus year old 
grandmother of defendant, who says that on December 3, 1987, at 
about 1:00 a.m., defendant Mthrew her around the apartment" and "hit 
her in the face". 
2. Statement of Colleen Maguire,. who saw the victim Farmer 
in Farmer's apartment, 1966 South 200 East, A606 at about 11:30 p.m. 
on December 2, 1987 with her ears intact. Farmer was with defendant 
at that time. 
3. Statement of Marvin Davis, who saw Farmer at about 1:30 
a.m. on December 3, 1987 and noted the top 1/3 of her right ear 
missing. 
4. Statement of Daniel Sellers, a plastic surgeon, that 
Mrs. Farmer's ear was, in his opinion Mripped off" by some 
non-accidental human force on December 3, 1987. 
5. Statement of Lillian Grant, a physician, that Mrs. 
Farmer suffered from a skull fracture when seen by her on December 
3, 1987. 
(Continued on page 2) 
o before me 
r, 1987. 
Authorized for presentment and 
f i 1 i ng : 
DAVJ^D E. YOCOM, County Attorney 
December 7,1 1987 11S-/0575E 
ADDENDUM B 
-asga&SA 
lep^ty^Couhty Attorney 
rZourtside Office Building 
?231*'East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
ISaltLake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: <~(801) 363-7900 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BRIAN E. MAGUIRE DOB 8/25/48, 
Defendantfs). 
Screened by: J. Cot>e 
Assigned to: Special Victim 
BAIL: 
AMENDED INFORMAT: 
To.871^11428 
<2 iJ 
states 
crimes 
C$UNT I 
The undersigned 
on information and* 
of: 
*lief that the def endantf s) 
_, underoath 
"committed the 
GGRAVATED ASSAULT, a 4*4^4H&e?re^~Fe4rOnyf at 1966 South 200 East (i 
A606, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about 
•. December 3, 1987, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
• w ) Section 103, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that 
^ t ? ^ ,the defendant, BRIAN E. MAGUIRE, a party to the offense, 
atf^i^d assaults Clarice Farmer, v-*frd—3HVtejitiouaLly—caused—ser-ious 
' -bodily—injuryL^OL^Xlaric^—Farmer-; bv the use of such means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury; 
jtsi 
COUNT II 
MAYHEM, a Second Degree Felony, at 1966 South 200 East A606, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about December 3, 1987, in 
P <P 
violation^of Title 
Annotated 1953, as 
MAGUIRE, a party 
Clarice Farmer by 
Clarice Farmer of a 
76, Chapter 5, Section 105, Utah Code 
amended, in that the defendant, BRIAN E. 
to the offense, committed mavhem upon 
unlawfully and intentionally depriving 
member of her body, to-wit: Ear; 
Continued on page Z) 
|Uoluaty^Attorney^#87rif740?^^ 
^ 
0(b 
COUNT III 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL, a First Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, on or about December 3, 1987, in violation of Title 
76, Chapter 8, Section 1001, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, BRIAN E. MAGUIRE, a partv to 
the offense, committed the Second Degree Felony charged in 
Count II above, and was then and there a person who had been 
twice convicted, sentenced and committed for felony offenses 
at least one of which offenses having been at least a felonv 
of the Second Degree, and was committed to prison, to-wit: 
Date Court/County Case #/Judge Charge/Degree Sentence 
3/4/71 
5/16/73 
3rd Dist.Ct. 
3rd Dist.Ct. 
22918/Croft Burglary 2° 
24930/Baldwin Homicide 2° 
1-20 Years 
10-Life 
NO BAIL REQUEST: The defendant BRIAN E. MAGUIRE is currently on 
parol from the Utah State Prison for another felonv. 
Therefore, pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Utah 
Constitution, it is requested that the defendant be held 
without bail on the above charge. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Scott Walton Kelly Kent 
Clarice Farmer Colleen 
Grant Dr. Daniel Sellers 
Sgt. Calvin Crockett John E. Foster 
Maguire Marvin Davis Dr. Lillian 
June Hinkley 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant relies upon the following in asserting the 
above charges: 
1. Statement of Clarice Farmer, the eighty-plus year old 
grandmother of defendant, who says that on December 3, 1987, at 
about 1:00 a.m., defendant "threw her around the apartmentM and "hit 
her in the faceM. 
2. Statement of Colleen Maguire,. who saw the victim Farmer 
in Farmer!s apartment, 1966 South 200 East, A606 at about 11:30 p.m. 
on December 2, 1987 with her ears intact. Farmer was with defendant 
at that time. 
3. Statement of Marvin Davis, who saw Farmer at about 1:^ 0 
a.m. on December 3, 1987 and noted the top 1/3 of her right ear 
missing. 
(Continued on page 2) 
* Statement of Daniel Sellers, a plastic surgeon, that 
Mrs. Farmer's ear was, in his opinion "ripped offM bv some 
non-accidental human force on December 3, 1987. 
- 5. Statement of Lillian Grant, a physician, that Mrs. 
Farmer suffered from a skull fracture when seen by her on December 
3, 1987. 
AfftSnt 
t 
Subscrrbed and sworn to before me 
this *p_h day jof January, 1988, 
Judge 
Authorized for presentment and 
filing: 
DAVID E. YOCOM, County Attorney 
L //[ UC&^. , Depu 
January 6, 1988(/ 
ty 
ls/0575E - lls/Amended 
ADDENDUM C 
in tne LMstnci v-ourt 01 me iigira?jnnTnai-4i>isirici 
State of Utah A P R 1 1 1 9 8 8 
THE STATE OF UTAH. * ^ c m H I n d ^ . , * * * 0*-Court 
Plaintiff / Oeftytv Clerk 
Affidavit of Defendant /O - v$. ^* - ( Aiiiaavit 01 ueienaam 
Defendant / 
I. A^^ i/v-mry^ v_ .. / i \y^i^xv.-K__.
 u n < j e r o a l n > neret,y acknowledge that I have entered a plea of 
ga^tothechargefs) of: ,^ ^f * / ) / 
(Name of Crime) 
Facts: i f) ' / 
)^UU<LA-fe.^/yv<u;<o (,v./ iW(v. (.tvUiT&if / > l ^ C U w > U'«/ '*'; 
I have received a copy of the charge (Information) and understand the crime I am pleading-goiny to is a mtormation) and understand tne crime i am pieac 
ttA'x^J A07(7^ *f-euy 
e of Felony or Class of Misdemeanor) (Degree of Felony or Class of isdemeanor) ^ 
and understand the punishment for this crime may be -r-' ' ^-J^LL_± **_^_—^;£-v\ / 
>i tU«W l l l t t f W^ -> j 
t prison term* or both. 1 am not on drugs or alcohol. 
My plea of^gwn^iVn^eelyand voluntarily made. I am represented by Attorney 
who has explained my rights to me and ! understand them. 
1. 1 know that! have a con$tituty>na] right to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I 
have entered a plea ofv-gmky. or to a trial by a judge should I desire. 
2. I know that if 1 wish to have a trial.! have a right to sec and hear the witnesses against me in open court in my 
presence and before the Judge and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. I also 
know that I have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and 
that I could testify on my own behalf, and that if I choose not to do so, the jury will be told that this may not be held 
against me. 
3. 1 know that if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not guilty must be by a 
complete agreement of all jurors. 
4. I know that under the constitution that I have a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means that 
1 cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless I choose 
to do so. 
5. I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I 
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Coun of Utah for review of the trial 
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the 
State without cost to me. i—-i 
6. I know and understand that by entering a plea of-gtAUy I am giving up my constitutional rights as set out in the 
preceeding paragraphs and that I am-a4mttting 1 am guilty uf the cnm^o^which^my-plutuf guiliris inteicd.:.— --,, < 
7. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaitinglentencing upon another offense of which I have been 
conviaed or to which 1 have plead guilty, my piea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. 
T7TT /£ c ~s 
8. I knuw that the fact that I have entered a plea ofgmky does not mean that the Judge will not impose cuner a unc 
or sentence of imprisonment upon me and luiproml^UiaVb BWfl mjdiHiuiie Byaftyont as to^wtettheiemcricifwUl 
9. No promises or threats of any kind have been made toinduce me to plead &^^A\^ following other charges 
pending against me, to-wit: (Court case numberis) or cqunt(s)): *?*?' ^jtJ*^r^^ - *' 
„K» :*S<* 
i<%\sK j^A^cTv^ 
will be dismissed, and that no other charge<s) will be filed against me for other crimes I may have committed which 
are now known to the prosecuting attorney. I am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or 
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made 
am ~ _ L years of age, have attended school through »h» '*< &'^» t S w r^\V-fc anSTraw
 read and 
understand the English language. 
Dated this ,3J . day of U/ fo ' ^ I 19 
z*+ 
M,<J*~^^ 
f /Defendant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me iAcGJJtEST A . / / \
 A9Vof 
H CMXON WNDLEY ' 
CM* 
P.. 41<MJ.<A*£. 
p ( ^ > 3 l A ^ S y ^ V N ^ 
7 ££ 
Uc d. 19. 
s-utrz**?*-
Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY: 
1 certify that I am the attorney for 'A-W1^ ^ A / uX f i t l tA . .^ - ^
 t h c defendant n a m c d above and I know he 
has read the Affidavit, or that I have read it to him, and I discussed it with him and believe he fully understands the 
meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief the statements, 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing Affidavit are in all respects accurate and true. 
/LLiU.< k ?W 
Defense Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case against & o u m /He ££*£±Sdcfendant. 
I have reviewed the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are true and accurate. No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been ofTered the defendant. There is reasonable cause to 
believe the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for the plea offered, and that acceptance of the plea 
would serve the public interest. 
£11424^ 
Prosecuting Attorney 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendant's plea of 
guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's plea qMjuilty^ to the charge, set forth in the 
Affidavit be accepted and entered. 
Done in Court this , sv . day of 
ATTEST/ . 
H. DJXON WNDLEY/ 
O U g L -
19 g&* 
J 
& r u \ i,i -\rvk-*sQ A ^ A . 
-~7~ 
^ ? C 
District Judge 
>uty Clark / 
— s 
ADDENDUM D 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT V ' 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF tytAH
 u
 r
" 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
RRTAN E. MAGUIRE (prison) 
Defendant 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
Case No. 
Count No. _ 
Honorable _ 
ClAfk 
Reporter 
Bailiff 
Data 
it CR88-377 I I 
one 
James S. Sawaya 
Susan Gray 
Cathy Gallegos 
Nick Kirk 
April 2 1 . 1988 
S2 The motion of d e f t , . to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied/There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by O a jury; D the court; O plea of guilty; 
S plea of no contest; of the offense of flggyavatAd assau l t a felony 
of the degree, O a class JL— misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by Dt foy , and the State being represented hy J« Cope js-now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of, 
a not to exceed five years; 
O of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
a of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
cr not to exceed o n * years; 
a and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $. 
.years and which may be for life; 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to ^ 
x defendant chooses to serve sentence at the Dtah State Prison 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
Q such sentence is to run consecutively with 
a upon motion of Q State. O Defense, D Court, Count(s) — are hereby dismissed. 
£ defendant to be given credit for thirty days served -
Q Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent Utah State Department, of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
St Defendant is remanded into the custody of thejSmm^^^x^SSSsB^^or deilvery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and CommjimSnfc^-—^ • ' ' , \ \ \ 
S Commitment shall issue f o r t h w i t h ?* / ^ / ' i l A 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney 
-ynr. i 
DfSTRICT COl 
A*TTES/T 
H. DIXON H4NDLO 
Page, 
ADDENDUM E 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE T /^^ -D 
STATE OF UTAH 
OCT 3 0 1392 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL & ORDER 
Criminal No. STllOZll I F 5. 
COMES NOW, 'Rtlih^ £-.-M KCu i(lt , the defendant in this 
case and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I have entered a plea of (guilty} (no contest) to the 
following crime(s): 
DEGREE CRIME S STATUTORY 
PROVISION 
PUNISHMENT 
(min/max) 
and/or 
Min. Mandatory 
A. Ar^uiAizn ASSAULT r ^ o ^j^ o-sy^s 
B. c±_x 
c. 
00625 
^.C/ks 
/J 
^^
V
'
/
 i have received a copy of the (charge) (information) 
against me, I have read it, and I understand the nature and 
elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading (guilty) (no 
contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as 
follows: g^g c4 pg^7^ 7J -hh nic^M . ^^^<zix^&^ CZ-yt^tf^ 
° i ~ 7 
/ ^ / ^ ' / My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am 
v criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the 
crime(s) charged are as follows: (3v \\c c e^n~£~*~^ \ ( ^ J 1, 
M ^ j j ^ To J^UQ<£uC^ S^^U^Cl^^ ^ t d u J l ^ r ^ v ^ W ri^^^jgrfQ 
I am entering cthis/these plea(s) voluntarily and with 
knowledge and understanding of the following facts: 
~^7^//^l. I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the court at no cost to me. I recognize that a 
condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, 
as determined by the court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so 
appointed for me. 
2. I (Ifrave not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I 
have waived my right to counsel, I have done so knowingly, 
ffV\ 
2 
00G2S 
intelligently and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
/ 
rf&M 
cftc**'1"''* 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this 
statement and understand the nature and elements of the 
charges, my rights in this and other proceedings and the 
; consequences of my plea of guilty. 
V ^ ) L 4# I f X h a v e n o t w a i v e d mY right to counsel, my attorney 
v
 is Ci^c^-~ and I have had an opportunity 
to discuss this statement, my rights and the consequences of my 
^^gjuilty plea with my attorney. 
5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
I 6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have 
them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have 
the right to compel my witness (es) by subpoena at state expense 
to testify in court upon my behalf* 
/ 7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf 
but if I choose not to do so I can not be compelled to testify 
or give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will 
ef drawn against me if I do not testify. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me 
I need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set for 
trial. At the trial the state of Utah will have the burden of 
proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. 
If the trial is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous. 
w fol 9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I 
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would 
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah 
rfo^. 
3 00627 
Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and 
that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, 
J those costs would be paid by the state. 
//O^ f 10- I know the maximum sentence jthat may be imposed for 
each offense to which I plead (^ guiltV) (no contest). I know 
that by pleading ((guilty) (no contest) to an offense that 
carries a minimum mandatory sentence that I will be subjecting 
myself to serving a minimum mandatory sentence for that 
offense. I know that the sentences may be consecutive and may 
be for a prison term, fine, or both. I know that in addition 
to a fine a twenty-five percent (23%) surcharge, required by 
Utah Code Annotated 63-63a-4, will be imposed. I also know 
that I may be ordered by the court to make restitution to any 
victim(s) of my crimes. 
11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive 
periods, or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to 
more than one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, 
parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I 
have been convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in 
the present action may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed upon me. 
12. I know and understand that by pleading ((guilty) (no 
contest) I am waiving my statutory and constitutional rights 
set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by 
entering such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I 
have committed the conduct alleged and I am guilty of the 
crime(s) for which my plea(s)cfs/are entered. 
^ ^f 13. My plea(s) of (£uil^) (no contest) ((is)) (is not) the 
result of a plea bargain between myself and the prosecuting 
attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this plea 
/y 
4 00628 
bargain, if any, are fully contained in the Plea Agreement 
/attached to this affidavit. 
/^j^ 1.4. I know _ and understand that if I desire to withdraw my 
plea(s) of ("guilty) (no contest) I must do so by filing a 
^ ^ mgfcipn within thirty (3 0) days after entry of my plea. 
/ *S5C VS. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a 
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by 
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they 
express to me as to what they believe the court may do are also 
J npt binding on the court. 
^73^//16. N o threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any 
kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no 
promises except, those contained herein and in the attached 
lea agreement,, have been made to me. 
^ / 17. I have read this statement or I have had it read to me 
by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know that I 
am free to change or delete anything contained in this 
statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of 
e statements are correct. 
p^ f t 18. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my 
/^^ttorney. 
19. I am ^ ^ years of age; I have attended school 
through the ade and I can read and understand the 
English language or an interpreter has been provided to me. I 
was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or 
intoxicants which would impair my judgment when the decisionwas 
made to enter the plea(s) . I am not presently under the 
influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which impair 
my judgment. 
rtffy 
5 
00629 
20/ I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, 
mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect 
or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily entering my plea. 
DATED this "^ day of &e^&ZL^ , 19^Z . 
Y\ ~,JU^ Q^l QLA l,\AM/D 
{ ,u < ••-~rv\ 
DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney fokJ*^— /^^tus^ 
the defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the 
statement or that I have read it to him/her and I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully 
understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and 
physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the 
crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal 
conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the 
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/EAR NUMBER 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that 1 am the attorney for the State of Utah in 
the case against ^-vt^u /?~XJSLHCC^JZ . defendant. I have 
00630 
reviewed this statement of the defendant and find that the 
declaration, including the elements of the offense of the 
charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal 
conduct which constitutes the offense are true and correct. No 
improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea 
have been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully 
contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement 
or as supplemented on record before the court. There is 
reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the 
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the 
plea(s) is/are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would 
serve the public interest. 
12L 
ROSECUTING ATTORNEY/BAR 07lt> 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement 
and the certification of the defendant and counsel, the court 
witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's plea of 
(guilty) (no contest) is freely and voluntarily made and it is 
so ordered that the defendant's plea of (guilty) (no contest) 
to the charge (s) set forth in the statement be accepted and 
entered. , 
4 $ ^ day of Qk&L^ DONE IN COURT t h i s __ 
the undersigned, Clerk_ofJhe -•-•• 
full, true and c o ^ o p y of an or £ a ^ . ^ x / f j£»~&n* '{S 
theCourt. ',
 ni\/j^uU\/CnO.(fi('{>-
Date 00631 
ADDENDUM F 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
JUDGMENT. SENTENCE 
Plaintiff.
 v (COMMITMENT) 
%v 
VS. ... \ ' 1 Case No. Q W < ? ? ? ? / 
Count No. 
fafltfihj £ ^ A O a / ^ \ Honorable J h ^ i ^ A ) . fcrfc,Tr7 
Clerk ( J fV[ &fori$ 
Bailiff ^ J JCL J ili ^ J f f A W - j 
Defendant. Date A j r t f . W S * / ? ^6, fig**-
G The motion of _ _ _ _ _ to enter a judgment of conviction lor the next tower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is 0 granted Q denied. There being no legal or otheiJc^&Q why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by C a jury: O the cou r tN^ lea of guilty: 
a piea of na contest; of the offense of ftiV^r**--9*&& ASSGULr ^ J > , « " 1 _ . a felony 
of the .3£^t fegree. C a class misdemeanor, being now present in couyt.&a^ead/.for sentence and 
represented by A* nfi£ci(\ ana the State being represented by J> k/^^k^^xsjmfi adjudged guilty 
of the aoove offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah St3te Prison: &£& ' c 
O to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life: 
j$ not to exceed five years; 
a of not less than ore /ear nor mo*e than fifteen years: 
O of not less than five years and which mav be for life; 
C not to exceed years; 
n and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ; 
G and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to _ 
C such sentence is to run concurrently with - — : rr— 
C such sentence is to run consecutively with &&'% X^UX M7tM ^ A V l * ^ . t * M S P . 
C upon motion of G State. G Defense. C Court, Count(s) J — 3P6 hereby dismissed.
 t 
• Defendant is granted a stay of the above (G prison) sentence and placed on probation irf the 
custody of this Court and under the super/ision of the Chief Agent. Otah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
G Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County C for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison. Draper. Utah, or c for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
^Commi tmen t shall issue fiftrTK QM*KV —, 
DATED this 3 f t day of 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney p *9e — 1 — of J — 
ADDENDUM G 
Thomas B. Brunker, #4804 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM, #1231 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : TO COURT'S SECOND SUA 
SPONTE MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
V. : AFFIRMANCE 
BRIAN MAGUIRE, : 
Case No. 950246-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
The State submits the following memorandum in response to this 
Court's second sua sponte motion for summary disposition. 
STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the reasons argued below, the State opposes summary 
disposition and requests an opportunity to file a merits brief. 
For the reasons argued in a separate, contemporaneous motion, the 
State requests that the Court stay the briefing schedule to allow 
it to supplement the appellate record. 
1 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
1. By information dated January 21, 1988, the State charged 
defendant with aggravated assault, a third degree felony, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1988); mayhem, a second degree 
felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-105 (1995); and habitual 
criminal activity, a first degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990) (R. 31-33). 
2. The State and defendant entered into a plea agreement. 
In exchange for defendant's no contest plea to aggravated assault, 
the State agreed to dismiss the other two charges and to stipulate 
to defendant's motion to lower the classification of his aggravated 
assault conviction from a third degree felony to a class A 
misdemeanor (R. 111-12, 266 at 2-3). 
3. The State fully complied with the terms of the agreement, 
and defendant pleaded no contest to aggravated assault (R. 266). 
The trial court granted the motion to lower the classification to 
a class A misdemeanor and sentenced defendant to a term not to 
exceed one year (R. 114, 266 at 14). 
4. By motion filed August 10, 1988, defendant moved to 
withdraw his no contest plea (R. 124-57). The trial court denied 
the motion, this Court reversed, and the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed this Court!s decision. State v. Macruire. 830 P.2d 216, 
2 
217 (Utah 1991). 
5. The trial began on October 29, 1992 (R. 570). On the 
second day of trial, after the State had already called seven of 
its witnesses, defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, and 
the State dismissed the mayhem and habitual criminal charges (R. 
570-71, 625-31). This time, the trial court entered judgment on a 
conviction for a third degree felony and imposed the statutory 
sentence of 0-5 years (R. 632). The sentence included credit for 
time served (id.). 
6. By motion filed December 29, 1994, defendant moved to 
correct his sentence (R. 636-40). Defendant argued only that 
imposing a lengthier prison term in his second sentence violated 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1995) (id.) . By motion dated January 3, 
1995, defendant also requested transcripts at State expense of the 
his second plea and the related sentencing (R. 696) . The trial 
court denied both motions (R. 760, 762). 
7. Defendant's docketing statement suggests the following 
issues for appeal: (1) whether defense counsel was ineffective for 
not challenging the second, higher sentence; (2) whether Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-405 (1995) precludes the higher sentence after 
defendant succeeded in setting aside his original no contest plea; 
(3) whether double jeopardy precludes the higher sentence; and (4) 
3 
whether defendant is entitled to credit for all of the time he has 
served. 
8. This Court previously entered a sua sponte motion for 
summary disposition. In its response, the State argued that all 
but one of the issues identified above required reference to the 
complete record, including the second plea colloquy, and that 
summary disposition was therefore inappropriate. The Court 
withdrew its motion. 
9. After the Court received a partial record, it reinstated 
its motion for summary disposition. However, the existing record 
still contains no transcript of the second plea colloquy or a 
transcript of the sentencing where the trial court imposed the 
allegedly illegal sentence. 
10. Defendant has filed a merits brief, addressing the issues 
previously identified in his docketing statement, as well as 
challenging the denial of his motion for transcripts. 
ftRgPMENT 
Defendant's claim that section 76-3-405 precluded the 
subsequent, higher sentence presents an issue of first impression 
in the context of this case; therefore, the Court should not 
summarily dispose of his appeal. 
Section 76-3-405 provides: "Where a conviction or sentence has 
4 
been set aside on direct review or on collateral attack, the court 
shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense or for a 
different offense based on the same conduct which is more severe 
than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence 
previously satisfied." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1995). On its 
face, this statute appears to preclude any increase in sentence 
once the court has imposed a lower sentence, including the sentence 
defendant challenges in this case. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has imposed limits on the 
statute's reach. Specifically, the court has held that section 76-
3-405 does not preclude correcting an illegal sentence even though 
the corrected, legal sentence may be more severe than the prior 
illegal sentence. State v. Babbel. 813 P.2d 86, 87 (Utah 1991). 
The State contends that the statute also should not preclude 
a higher sentence where, as in this case, the defendant enters into 
a plea agreement, pleads no contest as part of that agreement, is 
sentenced based on that plea, then withdraws the plea. Withdrawing 
from the plea rescinds the plea agreement, and the parties should 
be returned to the same positions they were in before the plea 
agreement. Nevertheless, no Utah case has recognized such a 
limitation. Therefore, the Court should not summarily dispose of 
5 
the appeal.x 
The State opposes summary disposition for two additional 
reasons. First, defendant has already filed a merits brief. 
Second, the appellate record is still incomplete. Specifically, it 
contains no transcript of defendant's second plea or of the 
sentencing where the trial court imposed the higher and allegedly 
illegal sentence. By separate motion, the State has asked to 
supplement the record.2 
1
 Defendant's other claims are meritless. The trial 
judge gave defendant full credit for the time he served (R. 632). 
Furthermore, defendant asked the trial court to correct the 
sentence only because section 76-3-405 precluded the higher 
sentence; therefore, he failed to preserve any of the other 
claims he argues in his brief. State v. Brown 856 P.2d 358, 359 
(Utah App. 1993). However, rule 10, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, provides only for disposing of the entire appeal, not 
specific claims. Utah R. App. P. 10(e). Therefore, the State 
does not request summary disposition of these claims. 
2
 The State will pay the costs of transcribing the 
relevant portions of these proceedings. Supplementing the record 
will moot defendant's appellate claim that he is entitled to have 
the transcriptions made at the State's expense. 
6 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the State opposes summary disposition of 
this appeal and asks that the Court allow full briefing. As argued 
in a separate motion, the State also requests that the Court stay 
the briefing schedule until the appellate record is supplemented. 
DATED this /4» of <^y^/ , 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
THOMAS B. BRUNKER ^ 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MMLINS 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO COURT'S SECOND SUA SPONTE 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following on this /frfe day of ^Ic/f^ , 1995: 
Brian Maguire 
Star One 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
C^U^^L^f <5*/y*€r^j&t 
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ADDENDUM H 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs 
MAGUIRE, BRIAN E 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 881903771 FS 
DATE 01/25/95 
HONORABLE JOHN A ROKICH 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK MTR 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
•MINUTE ENTRY* 
THE COURT DENIES ORDER TO CORRECT SENTENCE BASED ON DEFEN-
DANT'S FAILURE TO ADVANCE AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR SUCH AN ORDER. 
.CC 
BRIAN E. MAGUIRE . 
JAMES
 M. COPE ry\HMjL I•), /335 
I, the undersigned, Clerk of the U^h Court of 
Appeals, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a 
full, true and correct copy of an original document 
on file in the Utah Court of Appeals. In testimony 
whereof, I nave set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the Court ^ '-yi „ f) }™ O 
VJjsullX. J"v-\n *JM U*J W"Kv> 
ck^^K 
00765 
Date 
